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ABSTRACT 
 
By Kurnia 
 
 
Indonesia consists of 33 provinces, each of which has different performance in generating 
their revenue. The difference is caused by the fact that some provinces are endowed with rich 
natural resources and potential economic activity when some are not. These conditions 
produce fiscal capacity disparity among the provinces in Indonesia. In order to reduce the 
fiscal capacity disparity, Indonesia, which has started fiscal decentralization since 2001, 
implemented General Purpose Grant in its intergovernmental transfer scheme. This research 
attempts to find out whether the General Purpose Grant has succeeded to reduce fiscal 
capacity disparity among the provinces in Indonesia and try to describe the trend of FISCAL 
capacity disparity before and after decentralization implemented. The observed data is all 
provinces from 1994 to 2007 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background 
Indonesia consists of 17,508 islands. The five largest islands are Java, Sumatera, 
Kalimantan, Papua, and Sulawesi. Administratively, Indonesia consists of 33 provinces. West 
Sulawesi is the last provinces which established in the beginning of 2004. Each province has 
its own political legislature and governor. The provinces are subdivided into regencies and 
cities which today number over 440. On one hand, some provinces are richly endowed with 
natural resources, industry or services that can generate potential fiscal capacity, on the other 
hand, some provinces have limited resources. Java Island plays a dominant role in the 
economic and political life of Indonesia. Jakarta, capital city of Indonesia is situated on Java, 
moreover, based on history, it is the centre of powerful Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms, Islamic 
sultanates, and the core of the colonial Dutch East Indies is in Java Island.  
Since each province has different potential economic resources, it is possible that 
there is economic disparity among these provinces. Waluyo (2007) proved this disparity 
among the regions in Indonesia. His data shows that the Java-Bali islands only covers 7.2 
percent of Indonesia, was inhabited by 64 percent of the population but contributes about 60 
percent to the GDP of Indonesia. In contrast, Papua includes the area of 22 percent of 
Indonesia yet is only occupied by 0.8 percent of the population and contributes about 2.1 
percent of Indonesia’s GDP (Waluyo, 2007).This illustrates that there are both inequality of 
economic and population distribution in Indonesia. 
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In order to make closer service delivery to the citizens at the local level, to make 
efficient allocation of resources, to promote democratization as well as to hear local 
aspirations and preferences of the citizens (Sidiq, 2007), there is a strong demand to change 
the government system from centralized to decentralized. The lower level government is 
expected to better know what the local citizens need. The demand of change is getting 
stronger since the economic crisis hit Indonesia in middle of 1997. According to Smoke 
(2005), the demand of change also came from rich provinces which complained about 
insufficient revenue and decreased autonomy. 
Finally, in 1999, two laws concerning decentralization policy was issued; namely Law 
No. 22/1999 on Local Government and Law No. 25/1999 on Fiscal Balance between Central 
and Local Government. These laws responded the demand of change and shifted the 
domination of central government on local government in managing local affairs. 
Law No. 22/1999 (amended by Law No. 32/2004) brought major changes in 
responsibilities across level of government. It made the local government responsible for all 
public services except defense and security, foreign policy, monetary policy, judiciary and 
religious affairs (these affairs are still the domain of central government). The transfer of 
authority produces consequences in both intergovernmental fiscal expenditure and revenue 
responsibilities. In order to support the intergovernmental fiscal policy, Law No. 25/1999 
(amended by Law No. 33/2004) was established to introduce the change of intergovernmental 
transfer. 
Based on Law No. 33/2004, the system of intergovernmental transfer in Indonesia 
consists of three types of transfer schemes. These types are (1) Revenue Sharing (known as 
Dana Bagi Hasil-DBH), (2) General Purpose Grant (known as Dana Alokasi Umum-DAU), 
and (3) Specific Purpose Grant (known as Dana Alokasi Khusus-DAK). DBH is the sharing 
revenue from taxes and natural sources based on certain percentage from central to local 
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government. DAU is an unconditional grant from central to local governments. The local 
government as a recipient can spend DAU as their choice since there are no conditions 
attached to the grant. Both DBH and DAU are unconditional/untied grants. DAK is a grant 
with the specific purpose to fund basic public services. The central government transfers 
DAK with detailed conditions to finance local government function but in line with national 
interests. DAK is conditional, tied, or categorical grants, for example DAK has been used for 
education, for health, and for infrastructure such as road and irrigation. The new 
intergovernmental transfer system was replacing the previous system which has two key 
central transfers: Regional Subsidy (Subsidi Daerah Otonom-SDO) and Presidential 
Instructions Program (INPRES). SDO is salary grant for local civil servants and INPRES 
program is specific block grant to finance development activity in the regions.        
According to Brodjonegoro (2004), the centerpiece of Indonesian fiscal 
decentralization is DAU, which gives full autonomy to local government in spending and 
managing the grant. DAU becomes the center of attention for most of the local government. 
Simanjuntak (2002) explained that the importance of DAU as intergovernmental transfer is 
required to overcome horizontal fiscal imbalance issue. Empirical experience in different 
countries showed that the ability to collect revenue varied widely depending on the condition 
of the regions. DAU as part of intergovernmental transfer has the aim to ensure equal 
distribution of fiscal capacity to reduce inequality in financial capacity among the regions 
(Sidiq, 2007).  In conclusion, DAU has become a tool to achieve equitable distribution of 
fiscal capacity in Indonesia. Nevertheless, has DAU succeeded achieving its purpose? This 
study will explore the role of DAU and make comparison before and after new 
intergovernmental transfer system implemented in Indonesia. 
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1.2 Purpose of Study 
Based on Law 33/2004, DAU has the aim to reduce fiscal capacity disparity among 
the regions so the regions can fulfill their obligations to deliver the services to the citizen. 
The purpose of the current study is to describe fiscal capacity disparity among the provinces 
in Indonesia before and after decentralization era and to provide an answer as to whether 
DAU has succeeded in achieving its aim to reduce fiscal capacity disparity  among the 
provinces in Indonesia.      
1.3 Significance of Study 
This study will provide a contribution for the government to evaluate and to make 
policy about DAU and intergovernmental transfer in order to make fiscal equality among the 
provinces in Indonesia. The current study also is expected to enrich the research about 
intergovernmental processes in Indonesia, to enrich international studies about 
decentralization from Indonesia’s experience and lastly, the results of this study hopefully 
can be strengthened, deepened, and followed up by other researches. 
1.4 Objectives of Study 
Based on geography and economic conditions in Indonesia, as mentioned above, there 
are regions with high and low fiscal capacity. The objective of this study is to take a picture 
of trend of fiscal capacity equality before and after decentralization policy implemented in 
Indonesia and to measure and analyze the role of DAU in reducing fiscal capacity inequality 
among the provinces in Indonesia.   
1.5 Scope and Limitations     
The study will only explain the disparity based on the fiscal capacity measurement 
(fiscal capacity means financing sources of the region, it will be explained in the next 
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chapter). The reason why focus on fiscal capacity disparity is because the purpose DAU itself 
is to reduce fiscal capacity disparity among the regions (horizontal imbalance). 
The study is limited to data collected over the fourteen year from fiscal years 
1994/1995 to 2007. This data should provide the trend of fiscal capacity disparity during 
fourteen year and show last condition of fiscal equality in Indonesia particularly after 
decentralization policy started.  
The specific target population is all provinces (33 provinces) in Indonesia. However, 
the thirty third provinces, West Sulawesi was established in 2004. Therefore, number of 
province varied before 2005 particularly after decentralization policy is started. After 
decentralization policy is implemented, there are seven new provinces are created. Before 
decentralization era, Timor Timur is not included in the calculation since it became 
independent country (Timor Leste) in 1999 and currently omitted in list of Indonesia statistic 
data.   
The weakness of this study is the inability to include regencies and cities. DAU is 
allocated not only to the provinces but also regencies and cities. The study would be more 
comprehensive if the regencies and cities also included. However, due to the limited time 
available, this study only focused on the provinces.  Still, by focusing on only the provinces, 
this study hopefully can describe the implementation of DAU and find out whether the 
implementation of DAU has succeeded to reduce the fiscal capacity inequality in the 
provinces, and thus enrich the literature on fiscal decentralization in Indonesia.  
Other possible weakness of this study is that it only focuses to fiscal capacity without 
consider fiscal need as part of fiscal gap in analyzing the disparity. However, the Law 
33/2004 has stated that the DAU is a fund sourced from the National Budget allocated to 
bring equality in the fiscal capacity among the regions to finance the need of the regions in 
implementation of decentralization. Following the statement of the Law, the study tries to 
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find out the ultimate question whether DAU has successfully reached its purpose to bring 
fiscal capacity equality. 
The research involving fiscal need disparity could be carried out by other researcher 
to improve and to enrich the discussion about reducing fiscal disparity in Indonesia. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
2.1 Literature review of Decentralization 
Falleti defined decentralization is as a process, namely a set of policy reforms aimed 
at transferring responsibilities, resources, or authority from higher to lower level of 
government (Falleti, 2004). In recent decades, Sidik argues that decentralization has been a 
popular remedy prescribed to deal with the failures and inadequacies of central government 
to carry out effectively critical functions of the role of the government in the society 
reflecting combinations of many aspects mainly political, economic, social and ideological 
aspects. Decentralization has been promoted not only to accommodate cultural diversity but 
also to enhance democracy, foster economic development, improve government efficiency, 
and facilitate modernization. Decentralization must face not only the issue of social 
inequality in general, but also the problem of inequalities between poor and rich regions 
(Sidiq, 2007). From these opinions, it can be concluded that decentralization transfers the 
authority and responsibility of public functions from central government to local government 
to improve the services of the functions itself. However, the transferred functions must be 
clear to understand the decentralization.      
Falleti (2004) classified decentralization into three categories, administrative, fiscal, 
and political. Administrative decentralization comprises the set of policies that transfer the 
administration and delivery of social services such as education, health, social welfare or 
housing to sub-national government. Fiscal decentralization refers to the set of policies 
designed to increase the revenue or fiscal autonomy of sub-national government. An increase 
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of transfer from the central government, the creation of new sub-national taxes, and the 
delegation of tax authority are all examples of fiscal decentralization. Political 
decentralization is the set of constitutional amendments and electoral reform designed to open 
new or activate existing but dormant or ineffective spaces for the representation of sub-
national policies. Political decentralization policies are also designed to devolve electoral 
capacities to sub-national actors.  
Fiscal decentralization has become a world-wide “reform” agenda supported by the 
World Bank, USAID, the Asian Development Bank and many others, and also has become an 
integral part of economic reform (Kee, 2003). However, there are advantages and 
disadvantages of a decentralized system. Rosen and Gayer describe the advantages of a 
decentralized system in their book as tailoring output to local tastes, fostering inter-
government competition, and experimentation and innovation in locally provided goods and 
services (Rosen & Gayer, 2008). 
- Tailoring output to local tastes  
Decentralized government knows better what their citizen preferences and tries to get 
citizen’s heart and vote. It will enhance political participations at the local level, and at 
the end, democratic values and political stability at the local level will be achieved (Kee, 
2003). 
- Fostering inter-government competition  
Decentralized government will try to produce public goods more efficiently and be 
more responsive to the citizens to avoid they shift to other jurisdictions.  
- Experimentation and innovation in locally provided goods and services 
Decentralized government is just like a laboratory, in that once an experiment policy is 
working successfully in a state, eventually it becomes federal policy. 
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While decentralization, in theory, has these advantages, there are some arguments for 
the disadvantages of decentralized system. Rosen and Gayer consider efficiency and equity 
disadvantages issues in decentralized system (Rosen & Gayer, 2008). 
- Efficiency issues 
 A system might lead to an inefficient allocation of resources for several reasons:  
(a) Externalities, one community will not share their public goods utility (positive 
externalities) to other jurisdictions. The worst possibility is that one community will 
only transfer negative externalities to the others regardless of the responsibilities, for 
instance dumping waste into the sea. 
(b) Scale economies in provision of public goods, since one community will not share 
the public goods with the others, the cost per user of a public good is higher than 
necessary. A centralized system could build one public good utility and allow people 
to benefit from the scale of economies.  
(c) Inefficient tax systems, some taxes are more efficiently collected at the central level 
responsibilities to avoid tax competition and interstate tax distortions 
(Decentralization Thematic Team, 2009). 
(d) Scale economies in tax collection, local tax administration may cost more than the 
tax revenue itself. The economies might be fostered by cooperation among the 
jurisdiction. In many countries, local governments have very weak administrative 
capacities since central government has superior ability to administer tax activities 
(Ebel, 2001). This reason might be in line with Kee’s argument that the quality of 
national bureaucracies is likely to be better than local bureaucracies (Kee, 2003).  
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-  Equity issues  
Decentralization may exacerbate a central government’s ability to deal with structural 
fiscal imbalances and fiscal inequities may actually increase with decentralization (Kee, 
2003). 
      
2.2 Fiscal Decentralization   
As mentioned previously, fiscal decentralization takes precedence in the 
decentralization issue. Fiscal decentralization refers to developing local government control 
over fiscal resources. However, there is some debate on how to divide the public 
responsibilities related to fiscal affairs between central and local government. Fisher defines 
the sharing of those responsibilities: maintaining economic stabilization, altering the 
distribution of resources, and obtaining an efficient allocation of society’s resources (Fisher, 
2006).    
- Stabilization Policy 
Primary responsibility for the stabilization policy has been assigned to central 
government. This policy refers to the role of the government on maintaining price 
stability, and economic growth through fiscal and monetary policy. Local governments 
are inherently limited in influencing the economic conditions in each specific sub-
national jurisdiction. Moreover, local governments do not have any monetary authority 
since separate state monetary decisions would increase the cost of transactions over 
boundaries.      
- Distribution Policy 
This policy is also the responsibility of the central government since, firstly, only the 
central government is in a position to redistribute resources from wealthier to poor 
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jurisdiction. Secondly, differential local redistribution programs would be expected to 
create problems if factors of productions were mobile (Smoke, 2001).  
- Allocation Policy 
The prescribed role of decentralized levels of government in the allocation function is 
substantial because demand for many public services is not likely to be uniform across 
space.  
In order to carry out the allocation policy effectively, local government must have 
adequate fiscal capacity to make allocation decisions. Adequate fiscal capacity at either the 
province or district level depends on two components. The first components are those local 
resources, such as local tax, fee, charges, and public utility income. The second component of 
local government revenue is the intergovernmental transfer including unconditional transfer, 
conditional transfer and other transfer provided under the principle of horizontal fiscal 
equalization (Widarjono, 2006).  
Sidiq mentions many forms of fiscal decentralization to support local government’s 
responsibility (Sidiq, 2007): 
- Self-financing or cost recovery through user charges; 
- Co-financing or co-production, in which users participate in providing services and 
infrastructure through capital contributions; 
- Expansion of local revenues through property or sales taxes or indirect charges; 
- Intergovernmental transfer of general revenues from taxes collected by the central 
government to local government for general or specific uses; 
- Authorization of municipal borrowing and mobilization of national or local government 
resources through loan guarantees. 
-  
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2.3 Intergovernmental Transfer 
As previously stated, intergovernmental transfers (sometimes called 
intergovernmental grants) are one form of fiscal decentralization that is critically important 
for efficiency and equity of local service provision and fiscal health of sub-national 
governments. There are economic arguments for intergovernmental transfers that are based 
on either efficiency or equity as following (Decentralization Thematic Team, 2009): 
 
 
- The Fiscal Gap 
An imbalance between the revenue-raising ability of sub-national governments and their 
expenditure responsibilities (the "vertical imbalance") might arise for two reasons. First, 
there may be (often inappropriate) assignment of taxing and spending responsibilities 
such that the expenditure needs of sub-national governments exceed their revenue means. 
Second, many taxes are more efficiently collected at the central level to avoid tax 
competition and interstate tax distortions, so transfers are necessary to enable local levels 
to carry out their expenditure responsibilities.  
- Fiscal Inequity and Inefficiency 
A country which values horizontal equity will need to correct the fiscal inequity which 
naturally arises in a decentralized country. Sub-national governments with their own 
expenditure and taxation responsibilities will be able to provide their residents different 
levels of services for the same fiscal effort owing to their differing fiscal capacities. If 
desired, these differences may be reduced or eliminated if the transfers to each 
jurisdiction depend upon its tax capacity relative to others and upon the relative need for 
and cost of providing public services.  
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- Fiscal Harmonization 
To the extent that the central government is interested in redistribution as a goal, there is 
a national interest in redistribution that occurs via the provision of public services by the 
sub-national governments. Intergovernmental transfer is needed to finance the public 
services obligation conducted by the sub-national government.  
In general, several sources characterized intergovernmental grants into two types: 
conditional and unconditional grants. The grouping of type is considered by four factors: (1) 
whether use of the grant is intended for a specific service or may be used generally, (2) 
whether grants automatically are allocated by a formula or require an application associated 
with a specific project, (3) whether the grant fund must be matched by a recipient government 
fund, and (4) whether the potential size of the grant is limited (Fisher, 2006). The two types 
of intergovernmental grants are described further as the following (Rosen & Gayer, 2008): 
- Conditional grants (sometimes called specific or categorical grants) 
The donor specifies, to some extent, the purpose for which the recipient can use the 
funds. The vast majority of central government is earmarked for specific purpose, and 
the rules for spending the money are often spelled out in minute detail. Fisher 
categorized conditional grants into two types (Fisher, 2006): 
(a) Matching Grant, for every dollar given by the central government to support a 
particular activity, a certain sum must be expended by the sub-national government 
or in other words, it requires sub-national’s change in taxes or expenditures.  
(b) Non-Matching Grant (sometimes called lump-sum grant), central government 
stipulate the money for a particular public service to sub-national government but it 
does not change sub-national’s taxes or expenditure.  
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- Unconditional grants (sometimes called general purpose block grants) 
The grant is used without restrictions (or with very loose restrictions). These grants 
provide general fiscal assistance, almost always are allocated by formula. Such 
unconditional grants are sometimes referred to as “revenue sharing”. Nevertheless, 
Vazquez and Boex explain more detail about “revenue sharing”. Local governments 
could be allowed to keep a percentage of certain national revenues within their territories, 
such as the personal income tax (Vazquez & Boex, 2001). These revenues can be 
distributed on “derivation basis” or else they can be distributed on a per capita basis or 
other criteria or even formulas.  
 
 
 Figure 2.1 below depicts types of intergovernmental grants: 
Figure 2.1 
Type of Intergovernmental Transfer 
 
            Source: Ronald C. Fisher (2006), State & Local Public Finance   
2.4 The Rationale for Equalization Grants  
Why give equalization grants? Vazquez and Boex answered this question. First, in the 
absence of equalization, some local government often would have insufficient resources to 
fulfill their responsibilities at a minimum desirable level (by national standards). Second, 
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equalization grants reduce horizontal imbalances in a country or regional disparities and 
inequities by compensating sub-national governments with greater fiscal need and smaller 
fiscal capacity (Vazquez & Boex, 2001).  
What should be equalized? Sukhai states that both vertical and horizontal imbalances 
must be equalized (Slukhai, 2003). Additional studies note that there are two aspects which 
are closely connected to the process of designing the intergovernmental transfer system and 
the grant allocation system: vertical imbalance and horizontal imbalance (DFID, 2006). 
According to Department for International Development UK, vertical and horizontal 
imbalances are: 
- Vertical Imbalance 
A vertical imbalance arises when the responsibilities assigned to the local government 
exceed its fiscal capacity. The most common source of vertical imbalance is lack of own 
sources at the sub-national level. When local governments are expected to play a major 
role in delivering services at acceptable minimum standards, they depend in large part on 
central fiscal transfers to do so (Boadway & Shah, 2007). Vertical imbalance can occur, 
for instance natural resources revenue in Indonesia is collected by central government. 
Yet, the local government must take the damage cost of the environment caused by the 
natural resources exploration. The central government should share the income to local 
government to compensate the damage.   
 
- Horizontal Imbalance 
Horizontal imbalance occurs when there are differences in the fiscal capacities of various 
local government units. The horizontal imbalance appears when there are huge economic 
and financial discrepancies among regions - the inter-regional imbalance, or within the 
same region among localities of different sizes, especially between the rural and the 
urban areas - the intra-region imbalance. Increased decentralization of the local 
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government financial resources may lead to an increased horizontal imbalance; therefore, 
it is very important that other elements of the system of inter-governmental fiscal 
transfers, the equalization system in particular, keep this type of imbalance under control. 
For example, a high income region can provide better quality education and health such 
as school and hospital than can a low income region. The central government should 
thus transfer a sufficient amount of funds to provide the low income region with the 
similar standard of school or hospital.  
Figure 2.2 below points out which type of intergovernmental transfers has the 
objective to reduce financial disparities or imbalances among the sub-national governments 
(that is General Purpose Grant). 
 
Figure 2.2 
Policy Objectives of the Grant System Design 
 
   Source: Department for International Development, UK (2006 
   *LGU=Local Government Unit 
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CHAPTER III 
 
RESEARCH METODOLOGY 
 
This chapter will demonstrate the methods utilized by the researcher and the design 
presented with the rationale for its usage.  
3.1 Research Design and Instruments 
This study utilized quantitative research in order to achieve its purpose. Statistical 
analysis was designed to measure the collected data. The design was expected to be able to 
describe the various data of provincial government revenue and make better summary of 
current implementation on intergovernmental policy in Indonesia.  
 The instrument in this study is a document review which compares the theory from the 
literature review with the results from statistical analysis. The statistical analysis will be 
conducted by using standard deviation measurement, the coefficient of variation, and gini 
coefficient.  
3.2 Data Collection Procedure 
The aim of this thesis is to describe the trend of fiscal capacity disparity among the 
provinces before and after decentralization policy in 2001 and to find out whether DAU 
policy has achieved its purpose to reduce horizontal imbalances in fiscal capacity. In order to 
collect reliable data to answer those questions, primary data was collected directly from 
authorized agency and trusted websites. Moreover, with regard to enrich the relevant 
knowledge particularly on issues of fiscal decentralization and intergovernmental transfers, 
related textbooks, reputable documents, international journals, and internet databases (e.g. 
World Bank e-library) were utilized.  
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Primary data on intergovernmental transfer, province government revenue and 
regional population were obtained from Ministry of Finance of Indonesia, Indonesian Central 
Statistic Agency, and Indonesian Central Statistic Agency’s website.  
3.3 Populations and Sample 
The object of the research is DAU and intergovernmental grant which is transferred to 
the provinces in Indonesia and total provincial government revenue during year fiscal 
1994/1995 to 2007. The population of the research is all 33 provinces in Indonesia. Fiscal 
year from 1994/1995 to 1999/2000 was started from April 1 and ended in March 31. 
Moreover, since fiscal year 2000, period of fiscal year was changed from January 1 to 
December 31 yet fiscal year 2000 was transition fiscal year which only covered nine months 
from April 1 to December 31.   
Including all 33 provinces in Indonesia means the population is expected to describe 
the overall situation of fiscal capacity disparity among the provinces in Indonesia. Focusing 
on the span of fourteen fiscal years starting from 1994/1995 to 2007 is also expected to show 
the trend of intergovernmental grant, to reflect the recent condition of fiscal capacity disparity, 
and particularly to find out the successful of DAU policy implementation to achieve its aim. 
Finally, since this data was collected from credible and trustable sources, it improves the 
validity of this research, overall, enhancing the quality of the thesis. 
3.4 Data Analysis Method 
 As mentioned above, statistical analysis was used in the research to try to describe 
the trend of fiscal capacity disparity during fourteen years and to answer the questions 
whether DAU has succeeded to achieve its purpose that is to reduce fiscal capacity disparity 
among the provinces in Indonesia.  
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In order to measure fiscal capacity inequality, this thesis applied a variety of measures 
to highlight various dimensions of these inequalities. The selected measures are standard 
deviation and coefficient of variation, and gini coefficient. 
- Standard Deviation and Coefficient of Variation 
Standard deviation is the square root of its variance. In simple explanation, it shows how 
far the data range from the mean. A low standard deviation indicates that the data range 
is closed to the mean whereas high standard deviation shows the opposite side.  The 
coefficient of variation is a distribution’s standard deviation divided by its mean and 
expressed as a percentage. The coefficient of variation (CV) is one of the most widely 
most of regional inequality (Shah and Anwar, 2003). This study used simple coefficient 
of variation to capture the dispersion of per capita fiscal capacity.  
Figure 3.1 Distribution Variable 
            (a) relatively low inequality                            (b) relatively high inequality 
          
Both distribution above have the same mean, but the standard deviation is much 
smaller in the figure 3.1 (a), resulting a lower coefficient of variation.   
The formula of the CV is given below: 
   
CV = coefficient of variance 
 
%)100(
X
sCV =
20 
 
s = standard deviation 
X = mean 
The smaller the CV means that the smaller variations which indicates that DAU 
succeeds in reducing fiscal capacity inequality among the provinces in Indonesia. 
 
- Gini Coefficient 
 
The Gini index like the CV is widely used in the inequality measurement (Shah and 
Anwar, 2003). Following formula of gini index: 
      
yi and yj are the fiscal capacity per capita of provinces i and j respectively. n is the 
number of provinces, and  is the mean of the per capita fiscal capacity. Gu varies 
from 0 for perfect equality to 1 for perfect inequality. The Gini index thus measured is 
the arithmetic average of n(n−1) differences of per capita fiscal capacity, taken as 
absolute values divided by the maximum possible value of this average, . 
Fourteen fiscal years (1994/1995 - 2007) will be analyzed to see the trend during 
those years. Statistical analysis will be conducted using Microsoft Excel and MegaStat. Mega 
Stat is a Microsoft Excel add-in that performs statistical analysis within an Excel workbook. 
It has the capability to produce and process statistical reports.  
The statistical analysis method which used in this study (standard deviation, 
coefficient of variation and Gini coefficient) was widely conducted in measuring disparity 
(Shah and Anwar, 2003). The usage of Microsoft Excel and MegaStat application would help 
to calculate the result more accurate yet would improve the reliability of this study despite it 
is not the best application. Overall, the methodology would help reaching the purpose of 
study as mentioned previously.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFER IN INDONESIA: 
DATA AND STATISTICAL RESULTS 
 
This chapter is presented in two main parts. The first part gives a picture about the 
implementation of intergovernmental transfers in Indonesia. The second part presents the 
statistical results.  
4.1 Intergovernmental Transfers in Indonesia 
The discussion on intergovernmental transfer in Indonesia is divided by two periods: 
after and before Law on Decentralization is implemented in 2001. 
4.1.1 Intergovernmental Transfer in Decentralization Era 
In line with Law No. 33 Year 2004 on Fiscal Balance between Central and Local 
Government, the system of intergovernmental transfer in Indonesia comprises three schemes 
of transfer. These are revenue sharing (DBH), general purpose grants (DAU), and specific 
purpose grants (DAK).    
A. Revenue Sharing (Dana Bagi Hasil-DBH) 
According to Law No. 33 Year 2004 “DBH is sourced from the National Budget and 
shared out to the regions at a certain percentage”. Currently there are three types of revenue 
that are allocated to the regions: property taxes, natural resources, and personal income taxes. 
The list of natural resources shared to the local government is forestry, general mining, 
fishery, oil, gas, and geothermal mining. 
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B. General Purpose Grant (Dana Alokasi Umum-DAU) 
According to Law 33 Year 2004 “DAU is a fund sourced from the National Budget 
allocated to bring equality in the fiscal capacity among the regions to finance the need of the 
regions in implementation of decentralization”. The total amount of DAU shall be at least 26 
percent of Net National Income as established in the National Budget.  
Due to its purpose to bring equality in the fiscal capacity, DAU is calculated by basic 
allocation (BA) and fiscal gap (FG) formula or DAU=BA+ FG. Basic allocation is calculated 
based on total salaries of public servants in the region. Fiscal gap (FG) formula is Fiscal Need 
(FN) deducted by Fiscal Capacity (FC) or FG=FN-FC. Fiscal need of a region means the 
financing requirements of the region in providing basic public services. Financing 
requirements shall be measured by total population (POP), area size (AREA), construction 
cost index (CCI), gross regional domestic product per capita (RYp), and human development 
index (HDI) or FN=f(POP, AREA, CCI, RYp, HDI). Fiscal capacity of a region means 
financing sources of the region derived from Local Own Revenue (LOR) and Revenue 
Sharing (RS) or FC=LOR+RS. If Fiscal Need exceeds Fiscal Capacity, it implies that the 
region is less natural resources or potential economy activity and vice versa. DAU for region 
shall be allocated based on BA and FG. The larger the Fiscal Need, the bigger the allocated 
DAU. The national proportion of DAU between provinces and regencies/cities are 10 percent 
and 90 percent respectively.  
C. Specific Purpose Grant (Dana Alokasi Khusus-DAK) 
According to Law No. 33 Year 2004 “DAK is sourced from the National Budget 
meant to help funding special activities in certain regions being the governmental affairs of 
the region in accordance with national priorities”. DAK is allocated to help funding important 
needs which cannot be estimated in the DAU formula and to assist with local government 
expenditures related to national priorities or commitment. DAK are designed as matching 
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grants, that is, the local government as recipient must provide a contribution from their own 
budget to the project. The matching rate is ten percent of the central government’s 
contribution.  
Sidiq (2007) described that the system of intergovernmental transfer in Indonesia has 
six main objectives: 
1. Address vertical imbalance between levels of government-the general revenue shortfalls 
of sub-national government (DBH and DAU); 
2. Equalize regional government fiscal capacities to deliver services (DAU); 
3. Encourage regional expenditure on national development priorities (DAK); 
4. Promote the attainment of minimum infrastructure standards (DAK); 
5. Compensate for benefit/cost spillovers in priority areas (DAK); 
6. Stimulate regional commitment (DAK); and 
7. Stimulate revenue mobilization (DBH, DAU, and DAK) 
For additional information, in 2001, Law No. 21/2001 on Special Autonomy for 
Papua Province was established. This law provides an additional allocation of funds for the 
Papua Province, equal to 2% of the national DAU allocation. The purpose of this additional 
fund for Papua Province is to catch up the backwardness of Papua Province (including West 
Papua) with other regions. This additional fund is not part of intergovernmental scheme 
according to Law No. 33/2004. In fact, this additional fund increases the received amount of 
government Papua Government from Central Government. In the financial report established 
by Ministry of Finance and Central Statistic Agency, additional allocation for Papua Province 
is recorded under the “Other Revenue” classifications. 
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4.1.2 Intergovernmental Transfers before the Decentralization Era 
There were two key central transfers before decentralization, the Regional Subsidy 
(Subsidi Daerah Otonom-SDO) and the Presidential Instructions Program (INPRES). SDO 
has the purpose to support routine regional government spending and most of its spending 
(about 95%) is for financing regional public servants. from the salary includes basic salary, 
family and children allowance, rice allowance, local overprice allowance (for high living cost 
areas), and functional allowance. SDO can be categorized as specific purpose grant since 
local governments do not have the authority to stipulate the purpose of SDO since the 
purpose has already stipulated by central government.  
Unlike SDO which is only for routine local spending, INPRES is transferred to 
finance development activity in the regions. There are many types of INPRES, for village 
development, primary school development, health infrastructure, reforestation, traditional 
markets, road infrastructure improvements, and underdeveloped villages. Two INPRES 
which considered successful by the World Bank are INPRES for primary school and health 
infrastructure (Mahi and Adriansyah, 2002). Like SDO, INPRES can be categorized as a 
specific purpose grant. 
The history of intergovernmental grants before the decentralization era shows that the 
role of central government was to stipulate the type of grant for the regions. The problem 
arose when the purpose of grant was dominated by central government because in the reality, 
some regions feel that the grant is not really appropriate for their development. At the end, 
the grant was not efficient and effective for them. Learning from this history, fiscal 
decentralization in Law No. 25/1999 emphasized the grant which has general nature and give 
regions flexibility to manage the grant as their needs. 
 
 
25 
 
4.2 Data and Statistical Results 
4.2.1 Intergovernmental Transfer Data   
The section will present the statistical results, which will be analyzed in the next 
chapter. The previous chapter mentioned that the analysis of fiscal disparities will be 
conducted over fourteen years from fiscal year 1994/1995 to 2007. This section will only 
present the results, and the analysis will be conducted in next chapter. Note that following 
results are calculated by per capita basis.  
The budget for intergovernmental grant was increasing substantially year by year 
particularly since law packages concerning decentralization started to be implemented in 
fiscal year 2001. The Government of Indonesia has shown their commitment to support the 
implementation of regional autonomy and fiscal decentralization. This is shown by the trend 
of intergovernmental transfer fund in graph 4.1 below.  
Source: Ministry of Finance and Central Statistic Agency, processed by author 
In the transition year of the decentralization era from fiscal year 2000 to 2001, the 
intergovernmental transfer has increased more than twice, and since 2001, has increased more 
than three times in 2007. The data proves that the decentralization policy not only transfer 
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authority and functions to the local government but also is followed by the transfer of money 
to finance the obligation of the local government to deliver minimum services to the citizens. 
Moreover, regarding with these grants, hopefully the quality of services will be better in the 
decentralization era. 
Figure 4.1. 
Proportion of Intergovernmental Grants to  
Provincial Government Revenue 
 
Source: Own Calculation 
Note: Top Four is group of provinces which has high revenue and vice versa   
 
 
In the decentralization era, the reliance on intergovernmental grant is decreasing. This 
phenomenon might appear due to larger authority of the provincial government to generate 
their own revenue besides relying on grants from the central government. Nevertheless, the 
reliance level is at a moderate level that is around fifty percent.  
The interesting fact from the table is that the group of high government revenue 
provinces has a bigger proportion of intergovernmental grant as their revenue than the low 
revenue group. In other word, the reason why rich provinces with high revenue might be 
because of their reliance on intergovernmental grants, rather than their capability to generate 
their own revenue. 
 
4.2.2 General Purpose Grant (DAU) Data   
After a decentralization policy is implemented, DAU become an important revenue 
source for the local government. Graph 4.2 shows the trend of DAU from 2001 to 2007.  
Before After
Top 4 66.68% 56.13%
Bottom 4 63.16% 47.41%
All Provinces 71.56% 59.11%
Decentralization
Provinces
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Source: Ministry of Finance and Central Statistic Agency 
 
The DAU increased year by year except in 2004. The number of DAU increased 
almost twice in 2006. The increase might be because the amendment of Law No. 25/1999 to 
law No. 33/2004. One such amendment is the changes of the amount of DAU allocation in 
the National Budget. Based on amendment, starting fiscal year 2008, the percentage of DAU 
is changed from at lease 25 percent become 26 percent of Net National Income (NNI) as 
established in National Budget. However, there was a transition period such that the 
percentage of DAU was 25.5 percent from 2006 to 2007. The number of DAU in 2009 would 
be expected to increase more when 26 percent of NNI is implemented.        
The number of DAU has increased year by year, but the question is raised as to 
DAU’s contribution for provincial government revenues. Graph 4.3 shows the reliance of 
DAU as revenue source for provincial governments. During seven years, the chart show that 
the big four provinces of high provincial government revenue had a lower reliance on DAU 
than the bottom four provinces. In average proportion during the seven years, the top four 
government revenue had 14.62 percent reliance on DAU while the bottom four had 35.75 
percent. Overall, provincial governments on average relied on DAU as 31.71 percent for their 
revenue. An interesting fact is that, after 2005, all provinces seemed to be getting a higher 
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
in
 R
up
ia
h
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Graph 4.2.
Trend of General Purpose Grant (DAU)
for Provincial Government
on average per capita
28 
 
proportion frk  DAU. It is probably because the allocation of DAU increased after law 
amendment.      
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Central Statistic Agency 
 
Graph 4.4 shows the intergovernmental transfer fund especially after the 
decentralization policy was implemented. The graph depicts the grant scheme with and 
without DAU calculation.  
 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Central Statistic Agency 
Graph 4.4.
Trend of Intergovernmental Grant After 
Decentralization Era for Provincial Government
on average per capita
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Intergovernmental grant without DAU showed an increase except for 2006. However 
the increase of DAU in the same year (2006) made the consistency of total intergovernmental 
grants increase year by year. The difference between intergovernmental grant with and 
without DAU is larger year by year. The increasing number of DAU every year probably has 
three implications. First, if the increase of DAU is distributed to the provincial government 
that has low fiscal capacity, it would reduce the fiscal capacity disparity. Second, if the 
distribution is equally shared to all provincial governments, then this situation would keep 
fiscal capacity disparity rising among the provinces.  Last, the worst case if it is distributed to 
a rich or high fiscal capacity province, as this would make the fiscal capacity disparity larger.  
Additional information, it was explained that intergovernmental transfers consist of 
DAU, DAK and DBH. However, since the DAK is prioritized by central government for city 
or municipalities (not for provinces),therefore, it is assumed that in this study, the provincial 
government revenue calculation was without DAK since the provincial government do not 
receive DAK scheme or the number DAK is very small or not significant.  
The last discussion of this chapter will provide the statistical results as given in table 
4.2. The range of calculations is during the fiscal year 1994/1995 to 2000. These calculations 
do not include DAU since the DAU scheme is implemented in the decentralization era. 
Therefore, the calculation of DAU is started in 2001 when the Law No. 25/1999 implemented 
as a sign of decentralization era. After 2001, the intergovernmental grants calculation is 
divided into the calculation with and without DAU. The separation of calculation has the 
purpose to see whether the DAU has succeeded playing its role in reducing fiscal capacity 
disparity.  
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Figure 4.2 Summary Statistic  
 
       Source: Own Calculation 
     Note: DAU not available during (n/a) year above  
 
 The analysis of the statistical results will be discussed in the next chapter.     
 
 
 
      
Year DAU Count Mean Std Dev Min Max CV Gini
1994/1995 n/a 26 58,769 44,647 19,988 232,321 0.76 0.34
1995/1996 n/a 26 83,165 125,464 20,642 652,249 1.51 0.49
1996/1997 n/a 26 67,937 53,082 22,971 284,328 0.78 0.33
1997/1998 n/a 26 72,466 55,500 24,619 295,876 0.77 0.33
1998/1999 n/a 26 64,856 57,970 10,098 269,739 0.89 0.40
1999/2000 n/a 25 101,551 94,867 26,383 368,246 0.93 0.43
2000 n/a 25 76,506 49,352 22,152 228,413 0.65 0.32
without 29 114,372 170,232 27,652 784,055 1.49 0.53
with 29 166,894 186,831 54,648 876,514 1.12 0.43
without 30 177,088 229,517 26,527 921,031 1.30 0.56
with 30 251,593 237,932 81,835 1,014,536 0.95 0.40
without 30 190,218 268,911 28,803 1,079,377 1.41 0.55
with 30 279,122 283,698 77,917 1,193,909 1.02 0.43
without 31 227,252 299,114 42,075 1,272,416 1.32 0.53
with 31 317,814 309,808 92,354 1,380,961 0.97 0.42
without 33 274,195 361,380 37,341 1,433,788 1.32 0.54
with 33 368,213 375,148 104,927 1,521,033 1.02 0.44
without 33 250,696 338,874 43,509 1,616,407 1.35 0.52
with 33 417,687 364,961 112,177 1,703,537 0.87 0.39
without 33 345,955 501,251 55,892 2,021,111 1.45 0.56
with 33 531,463 530,889 137,001 2,488,372 1.00 0.43
2006
2007
2004
2005
2002
2003
2001
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CHAPTER V 
 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter will present an analysis of the results as presented in the previous chapter. 
A summary will be presented at the end of the chapter as related to the research questions 
given in the purpose of study.  
5.1 Analysis 
5.1.1 Intergovernmental Transfer Before and After Decentralization Era  
According to the statistical results in the previous chapter, the calculation using 
coefficient of variation and gini coefficient showed a consistent trend. The consistent trend of 
coefficient of variation and gini coefficient is depicted in graph 5.1 below.     
 
Source: own calculation           
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Fiscal capacity disparity fluctuated greatly before the decentralization era while fiscal 
capacity disparity in decentralization era was more relatively stable. However, even though 
the disparity was fluctuating before the decentralization era, the coefficient of variation and 
gini coefficient show a lower level than in the decentralization era. During the seven years 
before the decentralization era, the coefficient of variation was moving in the range from 
64.51 percent to 93.42 percent (except in fiscal year 1995/1996 at 150.86 percent) or on 
average was 89.84 percent. Fiscal capacity disparity was relatively stable and at a high level 
after decentralization era. During the seven years of decentralization era, the trend of 
coefficient of variation was stable above 94.57 percent (except in fiscal year 2006 at 87.38 
percent) or on average was 99.26 percent. In interpreting the coefficient of variation, 89.84 
percent and 99.26 percent for before and after decentralization era respectively were far away 
from zero, which implies that fiscal capacity disparity appeared during both eras.  
As mentioned in the first paragraph, the gini coefficient showed consistent trend of 
movement with the coefficient of variation. Before fiscal decentralization era, the gini 
coefficient was fluctuating in the range from 0.32 to 0.43 (except in fiscal year 1996/1996 at 
0.49) or on average was 0.37. Meanwhile, after the decentralization era, the gini coefficient 
was stable in range from 0.39 to 0.44 or on average was 0.42. In the gini coefficient case, the 
rate of 0.37 and 0.42 can be interpreted that fiscal capacity disparity was at a moderate level. 
Moreover, similar with the result of coefficient of variation, the gini coefficient of fiscal 
capacity disparity increased in the decentralization era. 
 As for the other measurement, standard deviation, it is shown clearly through the 
graph that the fiscal gap was getting larger after the decentralization policy was implemented. 
In the graph 5.2, the standard deviation line is widening from the mean line especially after 
the decentralization era. The line in the graph supports the previous results of the coefficient 
of variation and gini coefficient, which showed that fiscal capacity disparity increased after 
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the decentralization era. Standard deviation average before the decentralization era was 
68,697 rupiah (Indonesian currency) per capita. After the decentralization era, the average 
amount increased more than four times to become 327,038 rupiah per capita.         
 
Source: own calculation    
The three measurements shown before strengthen the statement that after the 
decentralization policy was implemented, fiscal capacity disparity among the provinces 
increased. It implies that the increasing of intergovernmental grant after decentralization 
policy is not followed by the equal distribution of the grants. The cause of the bigger gap of 
fiscal capacity disparity is probably because of the revenue sharing distribution. In the 
decentralization era, the rich provinces are getting richer and leave the poor provinces behind. 
The provinces which have a rich endowment of natural resources or potential economy would 
have bigger revenue sharing. The other possibility is that the sizeable population makes the 
amount of grants become smaller per capita.  
Graph 5.2. 
Fiscal Disparity Before and After Decentralization Era 
Standard Deviation Measurement
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Graph 5.3 proves that rich natural resources provinces with relatively low population, 
such as Papua, East Kalimantan, West Papua, Riau Islands, and Riau, have high fiscal 
capacity per capita. On the other hand, Java island provinces. such as Central Java, West Java, 
East Java, with high potential economy and big population have low fiscal capacity per capita; 
except Jakarta which has extremely high fiscal capacity despite of its large population. The 
graph also show that there is a large disparity between the big four provinces and the 
remaining provinces for the fiscal year 2007.          
 
Source: own calculation    
5.1.2 Role of DAU in Decentralization Era 
The previous analysis showed that fiscal capacity disparity after the fiscal 
decentralization era is getting wider. In line with the objective of this study, the next analysis 
will explore DAU’s contribution so far in reducing the existing gap of fiscal capacity 
disparity in the decentralization era.  
Graph 5.3.
Provincial Government Revenue
per capita 2007
0.0
0.3
0.5
0.8
1.0
1.3
1.5
1.8
2.0
2.3
2.5
2.8
C
en
tra
l J
av
a
W
es
t J
av
a
E
as
t J
av
a
La
m
pu
ng
E
as
t N
us
a 
Te
ng
ga
ra
 
N
or
th
 S
um
at
er
a
W
es
t N
us
a 
Te
ng
ga
ra
B
an
te
n
S
ou
th
 S
ul
aw
es
i
W
es
t S
um
at
er
a 
W
es
t K
al
im
an
ta
n
D
I Y
og
ya
ka
rta
S
ou
th
 S
um
at
er
a
C
en
tra
l S
ul
aw
es
i
N
or
th
 S
ul
aw
es
i
S
ou
th
ea
st
 S
ul
aw
es
i
W
es
t S
ul
aw
es
i
B
al
i
Ja
m
bi
G
or
on
ta
lo
B
en
gk
ul
u
S
ou
th
 K
al
im
an
ta
n
M
al
uk
u
C
en
tra
l K
al
im
an
ta
n
N
or
th
 M
al
uk
u 
B
an
gk
a 
B
el
itu
ng
R
ia
u
R
ia
u 
Is
la
nd
s
N
. A
ce
h 
D
ar
us
sa
la
m
W
es
t P
ap
ua
E
as
t K
al
im
an
ta
n
D
K
I J
ak
ar
ta
P
ap
ua
in
 M
ill
io
ns
 R
up
ia
h
35 
 
As shown in graph 5.4, based on coefficient of variation measurement, fiscal capacity 
disparity among the provinces was reduced since DAU was incorporated in the measurement 
of provincial government revenue. Before DAU is calculated, the average of coefficient of 
variation during 2001-2007 was 137.61 percent. After DAU was calculated in the 
measurement, the average of coefficient of variation decreased to 99.26 percent. Despite the 
decrease in the level of coefficient of variation, the percentage is still far from zero which 
means that fiscal capacity disparity has occurred.  It could not be clearly interpreted in 
qualitative terms whether this level is good, moderate or poor.          
 
Source: own calculation    
 
The calculation of gini coefficient for fiscal capacity disparity supports the calculation 
of coefficient of variation before. Graph 5.5 shows that the gini coefficient of fiscal capacity 
disparity without DAU was higher than with DAU. After DAU was calculated in the 
measurement, the gini coefficient decreased. During the seven year period from 2001 to 2007, 
the average of gini coefficient without DAU was 0.54. After DAU was calculated in the 
measurement, the average of gini coefficient  decreased to 0.42. In this level, unlike 
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coefficient of variation, gini coefficient in this level could be interpreted that fiscal capacity 
disparity has moderate level. Based on gini coefficient measurement, DAU has succeeded to 
reduce fiscal capacity disparity among the provinces after the decentralization era was 
implemented even though the level of disparity is still moderate.          
  
Source: own calculation 
 
 
The two previous measurements have showed consistent results and graph how fiscal 
capacity disparity decreased after DAU was calculated. The next graph shows fiscal capacity 
disparity using standard deviation measurement. Unlike the previous two measurements, 
current standard deviation can not clearly show whether DAU has succeeded in reducing 
fiscal capacity disparity. In table 4.1 concerning summary statistics, it is shown that the 
standard deviation has increased every year. However, the mean has increased as well as the 
standard deviation. The increasing of standard deviation does not automatically mean that the 
disparity is getting higher since the mean also has increased. Therefore, the difference in 
fiscal capacity disparity with or without DAU can not be shown clearly.          
Graph 5.5.
Fiscal Disparity After Decentralization Era 
Gini Coefficient Measurement
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Source: own calculation    
 
The previous paragraph explained that DAU has succeeded to reduce fiscal capacity 
disparity among the provinces. However, the gini coefficient showed that the level of 
disparity is still at a moderate level. Many questions linger on why DAU only succeeded in 
reducing fiscal capacity disparity to a moderate level, and whether the reduction can continue 
to a lower level. There are some possible answers for this question, requiring an exploration 
if DAU is being transferred to ineligible recipients (rich provinces still get or get in large 
proportion) or if the formula of DAU needs to be improved.   Other research will be needed 
to discuss about the formula of DAU.  
Graph 5.7 shows the proportion of DAU in the Provincial Government in fiscal year 
2007 with the percentage of DAU in the provincial government revenue. There are rich 
provinces such as Papua and West Papua which have a high percentage of DAU as their 
revenue (the high revenue is probably derived from the Special Autonomy Fund for Papua 
and West Papua). In the middle position, it appears that many provinces still have a high 
proportion of DAU as their revenue while poor provinces only have a small proportion. To 
live up to the spirit of DAU, it should be given to low fiscal capacity provinces to reduce 
Graph 5.6.
Fiscal Disparity After Decentralization Era
Standar Deviation Measurement
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horizontal fiscal imbalances. In the fact, the middle provinces have received more than poor 
provinces.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own calculation    
 
In Appendix 4, it is shown that poor provinces such as Central Java, West Java, and 
East Java (three of them are in the central economy and rich islands) receive large nominal 
amounts of DAU. However, Appendix 5 also shows that this three provinces have a large 
population (chapter one mentioned that about sixty percent of Indonesia population lives on 
Java Island). Therefore, the formula of DAU should be improved in that the population 
variable (since Fiscal Need= f(POP, AREA, CCI, RYp, HDI) needs to be prioritized more 
than other variables so the distribution of DAU per capita will be more equal.             
5.2 Conclusion 
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, this section will summarize the 
analysis related to the research questions given in the purpose of the study: 
Graph 5.7
Proportion of DAU in Provincial Government Revenue
per capita 2007
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1. Before the decentralization era, provincial governments relied on to 
intergovernmental grant for their revenue, on average for about 71.56 percent. In the 
decentralization era, the number decreased to 59.11 percent. These facts showed that 
intergovernmental grants are still an important financing source for provincial 
governments.   
2. The data show that before the decentralization era, fiscal capacity disparity was 
fluctuating but relatively lower in average than after decentralization era. This is 
interesting fact and needs further research to determine why fiscal capacity disparity 
is larger in the decentralization era.   
3. In the decentralization era, DAU has made a big contribution to provincial 
governments which have low fiscal capacity. The data shows that 35.75 percent of 
provincial government revenues rely on DAU. Meanwhile, high fiscal capacity 
provinces rely on DAU only for 14.62 percent. 
4. DAU has succeeded in playing its role to reduce fiscal capacity disparity among the 
provinces in the decentralization era (see graph 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6) though it is higher 
than the before decentralization era (see graph 5.1 and 5.2). In decentralization era, 
the measurement of coefficient of variation and gini coefficient demonstrates that 
after DAU was calculated for the provincial government, fiscal capacity disparity is 
decreased. However, despite the decrease in fiscal capacity disparity, the gini 
coefficient shows that the disparity is still at a moderate level. Therefore, a new 
question arises on how to further decrease the disparity among the provinces. DAU 
could be the right policy, but it needs to be answered if it is appropriate to allocate it 
to rich provinces since the aim of DAU is to reduce horizontal imbalances. It is 
recommended to carry out further research to answer this question.     
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5. There should be further research to improve the formula of DAU so the formula will 
provide better allocation of DAU per capita and as its aim, DAU will succeed reduce 
fiscal capacity disparity among the provinces in the future.     
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Appendix 1 
Statistic Result for Provincial Government Revenue Before Decentralization Era 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1994/1995 1995/1996 1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000 2000
count 26 26 26 26 26 25 25 
mean 58,769 83,165 67,937 72,466 64,856 101,551 76,506
sample variance 1,993,334,204 15,741,095,119 2,817,683,435 3,080,218,404 3,360,519,620 8,999,732,706 2,435,658,658
sample standard deviation 44,647 125,464 53,082 55,500 57,970 94,867 49,352
minimum 19,988 20,642 22,971 24,619 10,098 26,383 22,152
maximum 232,321 652,249 284,328 295,876 269,739 368,246 228,413
range 212,333 631,606 261,357 271,257 259,641 341,864 206,262
coefficient of variation (CV) 75.97% 150.86% 78.13% 76.59% 89.38% 93.42% 64.51%
Gini Coefficient 0.34 0.49 0.33 0.33 0.4 0.43 0.32
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Appendix 2 
Statistic Result for Provincial Government Revenue Without and With DAU In Decentralization Era 
 
 
 
without with DAU without with DAU without with DAU
count 29 29 30 30 30 30 
mean 114,372 166,894 177,088 251,593 190,218 279,122
sample variance 28,978,824,026 34,905,870,558 52,677,866,146 56,611,579,820 72,313,209,400 80,484,734,411
sample standard deviation 170,232 186,831 229,517 237,932 268,911 283,698
minimum 27,652 54,648 26,527 81,835 28,803 77,917
maximum 784,055 876,514 921,031 1,014,536 1,079,377 1,193,909
range 756,402 821,867 894,504 932,701 1,050,574 1,115,992
coefficient of variation (CV) 148.84% 111.95% 129.61% 94.57% 141.37% 101.64%
Gini Coefficient 0.53 0.43 0.56 0.4 0.55 0.43
2001 2002 2003
without with DAU without with DAU without with DAU without with DAU
count 31 31 33 33 33 33 33 33 
mean 227,252 317,814 274,195 368,213 250,696 417,687 345,955 531,463
sample variance 89,469,397,181 95,981,118,788 130,595,827,020 140,736,039,407 114,835,516,623 133,196,742,599 251,252,314,581 281,843,497,119
sample standard deviation 299,114 309,808 361,380 375,148 338,874 364,961 501,251 530,889
minimum 42,075 92,354 37,341 104,927 43,509 112,177 55,892 137,001
maximum 1,272,416 1,380,961 1,433,788 1,521,033 1,616,407 1,703,537 2,021,111 2,488,372
range 1,230,340 1,288,607 1,396,448 1,416,106 1,572,898 1,591,360 1,965,219 2,351,371
coefficient of variation (CV) 131.62% 97.48% 131.80% 101.88% 135.17% 87.38% 144.89% 99.89%
Gini Coefficient 0.53 0.42 0.54 0.44 0.52 0.39 0.56 0.43
2005 2006 20072004
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Appendix 3 
Provincial Government Revenue per capita 
No Province 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1 N. Aceh Darussalam 65,014 54,777 65,697 75,538 44,162 65,255 66,914 125,324 405,135 485,602 574,659 944,446 622,368 823,642
2 North Sumatera 52,212 52,678 57,977 68,348 31,151 45,943 45,815 75,868 115,085 121,395 142,933 153,111 169,931 199,024
3 West Sumatera 29,426 30,256 34,267 37,446 36,659 50,409 44,242 95,170 139,812 135,794 160,975 170,828 219,323 249,049
4 Riau 58,574 58,163 65,742 75,307 79,638 126,290 108,664 302,964 338,311 403,493 542,509 583,453 611,489 728,805
5 Jambi 43,021 43,706 47,493 51,530 48,790 66,822 75,667 109,904 158,940 216,509 270,000 284,077 339,506 389,583
6 South Sumatera 28,198 27,972 31,418 34,507 36,027 42,407 55,644 89,118 117,219 149,421 175,213 204,674 236,328 310,286
7 Bengkulu 56,035 54,597 62,266 68,592 73,838 86,577 72,293 122,732 150,508 210,625 242,223 252,579 332,064 407,186
8 Lampung 19,988 20,642 22,971 24,619 24,490 31,856 28,937 62,651 83,972 104,055 122,234 146,975 157,673 179,111
9 Bangka Belitung n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 124,107 252,049 327,163 364,077 418,539 451,890 563,502
10 Riau Islands n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 184,718 313,777 503,170 777,773
11 DKI Jakarta 232,321 261,537 284,328 295,876 269,739 368,246 n/a 876,514 1,014,536 1,193,909 1,380,961 1,521,033 1,703,537 2,018,229
12 West Java 35,271 37,209 39,910 40,378 17,761 26,444 29,351 60,299 225,464 91,205 113,214 123,825 115,651 139,387
13 Central Java 38,910 43,131 48,425 48,660 20,407 28,232 27,822 54,648 257,000 77,917 92,354 110,290 112,177 137,001
14 DI Yogyakarta 65,130 72,276 69,012 70,302 43,789 58,971 50,053 123,777 149,577 169,853 206,859 209,225 264,703 272,449
15 East Java 41,778 47,722 51,956 53,072 28,762 26,383 22,152 62,484 292,005 93,675 113,724 127,016 127,776 142,871
16 Banten n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 55,693 173,953 138,082 166,205 177,001 197,694 208,096
17 Bali 41,679 47,561 54,362 58,407 53,455 64,925 108,082 175,704 214,907 199,614 256,045 299,412 340,215 364,033
18 West Kalimantan 35,268 32,898 37,395 41,332 43,418 145,809 50,691 90,952 108,732 132,198 154,395 168,212 242,812 269,694
19 Central Kalimantan 131,123 121,900 135,603 142,445 107,747 93,831 110,306 163,917 105,747 222,049 265,052 297,143 420,017 525,276
20 South Kalimantan 84,996 59,112 68,566 57,469 68,256 235,530 109,954 130,668 166,755 188,574 223,210 281,524 328,028 411,573
21 East Kalimantan 109,101 95,247 110,939 118,210 146,492 64,844 228,413 704,845 804,186 968,398 1,032,995 1,295,223 835,425 1,469,335
22 North Sulawesi 37,920 76,260 44,491 47,938 50,658 90,624 53,310 156,336 196,212 195,544 206,667 229,258 302,558 345,235
23 Central Sulawesi 97,466 94,837 105,948 105,027 65,378 40,910 82,259 101,245 132,805 171,732 190,076 199,821 281,957 311,511
24 South Sulawesi 23,138 24,608 28,643 32,312 30,044 95,592 40,422 65,140 81,835 107,294 143,180 155,191 177,062 217,558
25 Southeast Sulawesi 45,850 50,522 60,437 64,215 69,698 108,829 89,729 109,808 138,912 185,806 198,505 199,884 307,820 350,884
26 Gorontalo n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 93,215 191,863 272,900 307,296 293,040 479,551 391,090
27 West Sulawesi n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 104,927 323,809 357,861
28 West Nusa Tenggara 22,988 24,005 28,072 33,716 32,995 64,925 61,198 84,761 87,556 106,788 117,818 126,427 174,811 200,563
29 East Nusa Tenggara 32,752 28,814 34,097 37,000 10,098 51,244 45,201 86,336 111,353 102,836 121,977 116,946 156,045 185,833
30 Maluku 52,884 49,623 53,157 58,693 60,875 117,487 185,871 202,098 288,333 345,850 412,063 448,864 502,308
31 North Maluku n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 212,383 284,689 334,417 349,688 482,497 542,843
32 Papua 46,960 652,249 123,188 143,170 191,926 208,327 188,041 349,877 918,891 1,028,216 1,101,883 1,425,834 1,606,984 2,488,372
33 West Papua n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 455,597 709,926 1,058,307
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Appendix 4 
Allocation of DAU for Provincial Government per capita 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No Province 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1 N. Aceh Darussalam 41,586 38,318 19,373 19,374 67,256 114,317 121,028
2 North Sumatera 23,910 22,384 25,918 27,463 25,199 43,348 52,796
3 West Sumatera 53,591 45,486 56,718 55,137 54,201 104,471 119,649
4 Riau 50,919 22,375 14,998 15,771 20,125 20,125 60,635
5 Jambi 58,696 75,574 86,928 92,784 92,421 141,997 157,444
6 South Sumatera 27,173 34,058 37,343 36,207 35,785 62,129 75,224
7 Bengkulu 95,080 113,741 149,419 152,950 148,878 244,018 261,967
8 Lampung 26,788 31,365 39,144 42,614 40,157 64,768 71,619
9 Bangka Belitung 73,885 162,472 214,550 189,148 179,555 264,209 306,057
10 Riau Islands n/a n/a n/a 2,608 20,366 139,624 261,469
11 DKI Jakarta 92,460 93,505 114,533 108,545 87,245 87,129 13,537
12 West Java 15,461 11,026 16,092 16,061 14,645 14,519 23,955
13 Central Java 24,192 17,956 25,034 17,713 17,198 17,198 32,858
14 DI Yogyakarta 35,320 68,721 64,709 79,476 71,387 120,373 130,809
15 East Java 11,654 13,036 11,917 13,327 12,526 22,614 30,064
16 Banten 18,370 19,213 21,222 23,198 21,932 27,168 36,616
17 Bali 53,575 53,383 58,688 61,207 59,087 104,418 129,015
18 West Kalimantan 48,398 56,838 67,950 73,303 77,134 144,614 150,750
19 Central Kalimantan 85,988 79,220 136,677 147,993 150,178 288,266 298,339
20 South Kalimantan 43,347 54,222 68,490 70,267 72,628 115,351 130,407
21 East Kalimantan 98,764 104,862 109,134 108,804 93,229 90,251 82,752
22 North Sulawesi 37,774 134,820 121,111 110,265 116,439 189,932 209,997
23 Central Sulawesi 58,109 87,551 110,616 118,633 118,420 208,149 218,808
24 South Sulawesi 30,588 31,982 37,034 43,806 44,306 67,851 79,831
25 Southeast Sulawesi 57,264 98,534 125,896 129,236 129,470 217,192 235,270
26 Gorontalo 54,407 154,818 216,088 252,809 228,820 424,420 315,985
27 West Sulawesi n/a n/a n/a n/a 67,586 263,255 288,059
28 West Nusa Tenggara 30,511 48,420 55,867 57,760 59,719 96,580 106,982
29 East Nusa Tenggara 39,479 63,829 74,033 79,901 71,702 112,536 129,942
30 Maluku n/a 164,375 212,956 233,574 222,969 339,691 380,370
31 North Maluku 90,844 177,009 196,196 260,385 259,267 382,976 419,304
32 Papua 145,019 156,077 178,496 167,099 223,349 432,037 467,261
33 West Papua n/a n/a n/a n/a 199,440 545,155 722,959
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Appendix 5 
Indonesia Population by Province 
 
Note: n/a= not available, the number of provinces is changed and increased since there are new 
creation of provinces
1971 1980 1990 1995 2000 2005
1 Nangroe Aceh Darussalam 2,008,595 2,611,271 3,416,156 3,847,583 3,929,234 4,031,589
2 North Sumatera 6,621,831 8,360,894 10,256,027 11,114,667 11,642,488 12,450,911
3 West Sumatera 2,793,196 3,406,816 4,000,207 4,323,170 4,248,515 4,566,126
4 Riau 1,641,545 2,168,535 3,303,976 3,900,534 3,907,763 4,579,219
5 Jambi 1,006,084 1,445,994 2,020,568 2,369,959 2,407,166 2,635,968
6 South Sumatera 3,440,573 4,629,801 6,313,074 7,207,545 6,210,800 6,782,339
7 Bengkulu 519,316 768,064 1,179,122 1,409,117 1,455,500 1,549,273
8 Lampung 2,777,008 4,624,785 6,017,573 6,657,759 6,730,751 7,116,177
9 Bangka Belitung na na na na 899,968 1,043,456
10 Riau Islands na na na na 1,040,207 1,274,848
Sumatera 20,808,148 28,016,160 36,506,703 40,830,334 42,472,392 46,029,906
11 DKI Jakarta 4,579,303 6,503,449 8,259,266 9,112,652 8,361,079 8,860,381
12 West Java 21,623,529 27,453,525 35,384,352 39,206,787 35,724,093 38,965,440
13 Central Java 21,877,136 25,372,889 28,520,643 29,653,266 31,223,258 31,977,968
14 DI Yogyakarta 2,489,360 2,750,813 2,913,054 2,916,779 3,121,045 3,343,651
15 East Java 25,516,999 29,188,852 32,503,991 33,844,002 34,765,993 36,294,280
16 Banten na na na na 8,098,277 9,028,816
Java 76,086,327 91,269,528 107,581,306 114,733,486 121,293,745 128,470,536
17 Bali 2,120,322 2,469,930 2,777,811 2,895,649 3,150,057 3,383,572
Java & Bali 78,206,649 93,739,458 110,359,117 117,629,135 124,443,802 131,854,108
18 West Kalimantan 2,019,936 2,486,068 3,229,153 3,635,730 4,016,353 4,052,345
19 Central Kalimantan 701,936 954,353 1,396,486 1,627,453 1,855,473 1,914,900
20 South Kalimantan 1,699,105 2,064,649 2,597,572 2,893,477 2,984,026 3,281,993
21 East Kalimantan 733,797 1,218,016 1,876,663 2,314,183 2,451,895 2,848,798
Kalimantan 5,154,774 6,723,086 9,099,874 10,470,843 11,307,747 12,098,036
22 North Sulawesi 1,718,543 2,115,384 2,478,119 2,649,093 2,000,872 2,128,780
23 Central Sulawesi 913,662 1,289,635 1,711,327 1,938,071 2,175,993 2,294,841
24 South Sulawesi 5,180,576 6,062,212 6,981,646 7,558,368 7,159,170 7,509,704
25 Southeast Sulawesi 714,120 942,302 1,349,619 1,586,917 1,820,379 1,963,025
26 Gorontalo na na na na 833,496 922,176
27 West Sulawesi na na na na 891,618 969,429
Sulawesi 8,526,901 10,409,533 12,520,711 13,732,449 14,881,528 15,787,955
28 West Nusa Tenggara 2,203,465 2,724,664 3,369,649 3,645,713 4,008,601 4,184,411
29 East Nusa Tenggara 2,295,287 2,737,166 3,268,644 3,577,472 3,823,154 4,260,294
30 Maluku 1,089,565 1,411,006 1,857,790 2,086,516 1,166,300 1,251,539
31 North Maluku na na na na 815,101 884,142
NusaTenggara & Maluku 5,588,317 6,872,836 8,496,083 9,309,701 9,813,156 10,580,386
32 Papua 923,440 1,173,875 1,648,708 1,942,627 1,684,144 1,875,388
33 West Papua na na na na 529,689 643,012
Papua 923,440 1,173,875 1,648,708 1,942,627 2,213,833 2,518,400
119,208,229 146,934,948 178,631,196 193,915,089 205,132,458 218,868,791
http://www.datastatistik-indonesia.com
Total
Source :SP (1971, 1980, 1990, 2000) dan Supas (1995, 2005)
Tahun - YearNo Provinces
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